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MANDATORY MINIMUM
SENTENCES: LAW AND POLICY0
BY ELIZABETH SHEEHY*
This special issue of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal takes up the
theme of mandatory minimum sentencing in Canada: the historical and
current manifestations in criminal laws; its public policy dimensions; its
impact on diverse communities; the pressures it exerts at different points
in the criminal process; and its constitutional implications. Mandatory
minimum sentences are sentences that are dictated by legislation as either
an absolute mandatory sentence, for example life imprisonment for an
individual convicted of murder in Canada, or as a minimum sentence below
which a judge cannot descend in considering sentencing options for a given
offence. When framed as a minimum sentence, the judge's only discretion
is to sentence above the minimum threshold up to the legislated maximum.
Although the legal scholarship on mandatory minimum sentencing
in the United States is vast' and there is a developing body of Australian
jurisprudence on the topic,2 the Canadian literature remains sparse? In
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particular, the literature that might advocate reliance upon mandatory
minimum sentencing is almost non-existent. The sole proponents of
mandatory minimum sentencing in Canada appear to be politicians whose
positions on the advantages of these laws are without a clear basis in either
research or policy. For example, when Justice Minister Allan Rock
introduced the new mandatory minimum sentences for crimes committed
with a firearm as part of the gun control bill before the House of Commons
in 1994,4 and when Stockwell Day advanced a platform for the Alliance
Party in the federal election campaign in 2000 that included a mandatory
sentencing law modelled after California's "three strikes" law,5 neither
politician referred to any Canadian data or studies that would support
general deterrence as a benefit of the new laws. In fact, there is little basis
in research for these assertions.6 The only Canadian study undertaken to
assess the effects of earlier legislation that imposed a mandatory one-year
jail sentence for the use of a gun in the commission of an indictable offence
failed to provide any support for the hypothesis that mandatory sentences
deter offenders.7
Thomson, "Preventing Crime or Warehousing the Underprivileged? Mandatory Sentencing in the
Northern Territory" (1999-2000) 4:26 Indigenous L. Bull. 4; G. Zdenkowski, "Mandatory
Imprisonment of Property Offenders in the Northern Territory" (1999) 22 U.N.S.W. L.J. 302.
3 With the exception of the work of Professor H6lne Dumont, the Canadian literature cited
below does not focus on mandatory sentencing issues in great detail: A. Doob, "Sentencing Reform:
Where Are We Now?" in J. Roberts & D. Cole, eds.,MakingSense of Sentencing (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1999) 349; H. Dumont, "D6sarmons les Canadiens et armons-nous de tol6rance:
Bannir les armes a feu, bannir les peines minimales dans le contr6le de la criminalitd violente, essai
sur une contradiction apparante" (1997) 2 Crim. L. Rev. 43 [hereinafter "D6sarmons les Canadicns";
H. Dumont, "De la Loi C-41 a la Loi C-55: La d6termination de la peine avec une main de fer dans
un gant de velours" in P. Healy & H. Dumont, eds., Dawn orDuskin Sentencing (Montr6al: Editions
Th6mis, 1997) 83; A. Manson, "The Reform of Sentencing in Canada" in D. Stuart et aL, Towards a
Clear and Just Criminal Law: A Criminal Reports Forum (Toronto: Thomson, 1999) 457; P. Stenning,
"Solutions in Search of Problems: A Critique of the Federal Government's Gun Control Proposals"
(1995) 37 Can. J. Crim. 184.
4 Debates of the House of Commons (30 November 1994) at 1510 (A. Rock).
5 A. Dawson, "Day Vows to get Tough with Cons" The Ottawa Sun (6 October 2000) 1.
6 For a thorough review of the rationales in support of mandatory minimum sentencing and the
available data, see T. Gabor & N. Crutcher, Mandatory Minimum Penalties: Their Effects on Crime,
Sentencing Disparities, and Justice System Expenditures (Ottawa: Department of Justice, forthcoming
2002).
7 C. Meredith, B. Steinke & S. Palmer, Research on the Application of Criminal Code Section 85
(Ottawa: Department of Justice, 1994) as cited in Dumont, "D6sarmons les Canadiens," supra note
3 at n. 56,61.
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Additional arguments in support of mandatory minimum
sentencing include the idea that specific deterrence and incapacitation for
persistent offenders may be achieved because mandatory imprisonment
will, at least, prevent the commission of offences by this group during their
terms. Another possible benefit of mandatory minimum sentencing is that
disparity in sentencing might be reduced, thereby controlling the
discriminatory effects of judicial discretion. Aside from these sentencing
rationales, it is clear that politicians often support m,Andatory sentencing
laws because such sentences are said to send a denunciatory message and
because harsh penalties are supported by large numbers of the general
public,g even if they cost a great deal and accomplish little.
On the other hand, mandatory minimum sentencing has been
criticized by the Canadian Sentencing Commission,9 the Law Reform
Commission of Canada,' the Self-Defence Review," and several national
women's organizations such as the Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry
Societies 2 (CAEFS) and the National Association of Women and the Law
(NAWL).' 3 The Canadian Sentencing Commission, appointed in 1984 by the
federal government,14 took the position that mandatory sentences cannot
deter people from committing crimes because most people do not even
know of the existence of minimum sentences. The Commission concluded
that potential offenders are deterred not by mandatory sentences, but
rather by the probability of detection. It argued further that mandatory
sentences are unjust because they prevent sentencing judges from imposing
8 See A. Doob & C. Cesaroni, "The Political Attractnenessof Mandatory 1Minmum Sentencc5:"
(2001) 39 Osgoode Hall LJ. 2S7 at n. 40.
Canadian Sentencing Commission, Sentencing RP[cfnn:A 4 Canadian .4ppreach. RtC.Frt of the
Canadian Sentencing Commission (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Scrwi .e, 19.61.
10 LawReform Commission of Canada,Homcide (Ottawax LawReform CommrvwnofCanada,
19S4) at 6S-70; Law Reform Commission of Canada, Rcedr fing CnmmalLaw (Ottar-a: Liv. Reform
Commission of Canada, 1937) at 59.
11 Justice L RatushnySef-DefenceRev-iew, FmalRcprt (Submittcd to the Departm2ntof Jut1e
and the Solicitor General of Canada, I 1 July 1997) at 192-95.
12 Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies, Rcspanse to the Department Jt~qtx Re
RefomrngCriminal Code Deences Provocation, Scf-Dcfnce and DefcnCee pf Piopa Otta c a :  ,
2000).
13 A. C6 ti, D. Majury & E. Sheehy. Stop Evetsui, o t lence .Aainst IMarnen INAIWLls Pcsitttn
Paper on the Defence qf Propen, (Ottawa: NAV;L, 2J000)
14 The Sentencing Commission was appointed in 1934 pursuant to an Orderm Councilof 10M3ay
19S4, P.C. 19S4-19S5, as amended on S February 19S5. P.C. 1935441, in accirdance v, Ah the Terms
of Reference assigned therein, under Part I of the hJqumesAct by the Governor General in Counal.
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sentences that fairly reflect the specific circumstances surrounding the
commission of offences and the offender.
The Law Reform Commission recommended that the mandatory
life sentence for second-degree murder be repealed and that discretion be
left in the hands of the judge to impose a sentence up to a maximum
sentence of life imprisonment. It argued thatjudges are best positioned to
tailor a sentence to fit the offender's motive and that the appeal process can
be used to correct inappropriate exercises of sentencing discretion. It also
pointed out that if the mandatory penalty were abandoned, the unique and
technical rules now in place to mitigate murder's hefty penalty, like the
defence of provocation, the "excessive force" limitation on self-defence,
and the special offence of infanticide, could be abolished.
The Self-Defence Review, established in 1995 by the Solicitor
General and Minister of Justice, recommended a modification to the
mandatory life sentence for murder such that a jury be given the power to
recommend a more lenient sentence "in exceptional circumstances" when
returning a guilty verdict to a charge of second degree murder. In reviewing
the files of ninety-eight women convicted of homicide who claimed that
they had acted in self-defence to avert the threat posed by an abusive
partner, Justice Ratushny, the head of the Review, found cases of women
who pled guilty to manslaughter, even with very strong evidence supporting
a defence of self-defence, rather than going ahead to trial on murder. She
attributed these pleas to inappropriate and systemic pressures placed upon
women accused of murder, among which the most important was the risk
of conviction for murder, with its mandatory life sentence and lengthy
periods of parole ineligibility. While acknowledging the impact of this
pressure on all accused people, she identified additional factors that bear
on battered women. These factors include responsibility for young families,
fear of testifying publicly and in front of the families and friends of the
deceased about his physical and sexual violence, and excessive self-blame
for killing another person.
Women's groups such as CAEFS and NAWL have opposed
mandatory sentencing laws for these and additional reasons, including a
concern that the power of prosecutors and police is unfairly increased by
mandatory sentencing. These groups have also argued that fundamental
sentencing principles, constitutional rights, and the division of powers are
disrupted by these laws; that systemic inequalities like racism are deepened
and reinforced by mandatory minimums; and that mandatoryjail sentences
contribute to the swelling of prison populations across Canada.
Despite the criticisms of mandatory minimum sentences, many
debates about their role and appropriateness continue, including whether
mandatory sentencing laws serve important symbolic functions that protect
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the interests of vulnerable groups or condemn the crimes of the powerful,
and whether discretionary sentencing laws can be rendered accountable to
equality principles. The Colloquium on Mandatory Minimum Sentencing,
held at Osgoode Hall Law School in March 2001 and chaired by Mr. Justice
David Cole of the Ontario Court of Justice, Provincial Division, was
convened in order to generate Canadian legal scholarship and informed
discussion on mandatory minimum sentencing. By publishing papers
presented at the Colloquium, the Osgoode Hall Law Journal hopes to
broaden the debate on mandatory minimum sentencing within the scholarly
literature and at the public policy level.
In this special issue, articles by Nicola Crutcher, Anthony Doob and
Carla Cesaroni, and Julian Roberts set up a framework within which the
policy decision to invoke a mandatory minimum sentence should be
considered. Crutcher charts the legislative history of mandatory minimum
sentences of imprisonment in Canada. She notes that while in 1292
Canada's Criminal Code15 contained only six offences carrying a mandatory
jail sentence, the current Crimzinal Code stipulates a mandatory sentence of
imprisonment for twenty-nine offences. More significantly, she documents
the increasing rate at which legislators are proposing, through a flurry of
bills to Parliament in the past several years, to add more offences to the list
of offences carrying a mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment.
Mandatory sentencing laws of this sort are, according to the analysis
pursued by Doob and Cesaroni, the politician's "quick fix" for crime. These
authors put current policy debates in a broader context in order to answer
the question of why this sentencing device continues to be lauded by
politicians ,hen every Canadian commission since 1952 has condemned its
use and recent data casts serious doubt on its deterrent effect. After
exploring the role of the judiciary and the media in perpetuating the myth
that mandatory minimum sentences deter crime, Doob and Cesaroni
provide a number of suggestions to shift the public debate toward less
punitive and more cost-effective crime control strategies.
Roberts interrogates the judicial response to the introduction of
mandatory sentencing laws, since sentencing judges bear the responsibility
of implementing these new laws within a pre-existing sentencing
framework. His research focuses on ten of the offences that acquired a
mandatory minimum sentence with the passage of the Firearms Act" in
1995. These new minimum sentences involved four years of imprisonment
15 R.S.C. 19S5, c. C-46.
16 Fireams and other weaponsct, S.C 1995, c. 39 [hurcinaftcr Fircamis Act).
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for those convicted of using a firearm while committing the offence.
Roberts argues that the legislative record does not support the proposition
that Parliament intended the new four-year minimum to be interpreted
through the proportionality principle, which would, if applied, result in an
overall inflation of the sentences for these and other more serious offences.
In fact, the available data for the sentencing patterns under the new
legislation suggest that judges have jettisoned proportionality and other
sentencing principles in order to confine the vast majority of the sentences
meted out under the new regime to the bare minimum required by law.
Two articles in this volume, one by H6lne Dumont and another by
Kent Roach, examine the constitutional implications of mandatory
minimum sentences. Dumont's article17 was written in response to the
passage in 1995 of the largest package of new mandatory sentences to be
enacted in Canada's history-nineteen in all-contained in the Firearms
Act. She argues that the new minimum four-year sentence of imprisonment
for ten of the nineteen offences contained in the 1995 amendments to the
Firearms Act violate sections 7 and 12 of the Charter,'" as well as
fundamental sentencing and democratic principles. While supporting the
disarmament of Canadians represented by the Firearms Act, Dumont
argues that a feminist and humanist approach must eschew minimum
sentences on the ground that legal practices requiring excessive punishment
can only degrade human dignity and increase societal intolerance.
The Supreme Court's response to the constitutional challenges to
mandatory minimum sentencing based on section 7 of the Charter is studied
in detail by Roach. He traces the evolution of the Court's jurisprudence on
challenges to mandatory minimum sentences, describing the retreat from
the 1987 decision in R. v. Smith1 9 through the subsequent decisions in R. v.
Luxton 2 and R. v. Goltz,2 to the failed Charter challenges in R. v.
Morrisey,22 and R. v. Latimer.23 Roach identifies several significant shifts in
1 7 This article is a translation generously provided by the Department of Justice of a paper that
was previously available only in the French language.
18 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B
of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. I 1 [hereinafter Charter].
19 [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 [hereinafter Smith].
20 [1990] 2 S.C.R. 711 [hereinafter Ltuton].
21 [1991] 3 S.C.R. 485 [hereinafter Goltz].
22 [20001 2 S.C.R. 90 [hereinafter Morisey].
23 [200111 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter Latimer].
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the Court's judgments over this fourteen-year period: from activist to
minimalist judicial review, and from careful attention to the individual
deterrence and rehabilitation needs of potential offenders to a perfunctory
vetting of the constitutional adequacy of the mnens rea requirement of the
offence itself. He posits that these shifts in Charter adjudication parallel
changes in federal sentencing policy, which has increasingly invoked just
deserts rationales over restorative justice principles. Roach calls for a
reinvigorated dialogue between the Court and Parliament in order to revive
both Smith and a constitutional commitment to individual justice.
The lessons that might be gained from comparative law
perspectives on mandatory minimum sentencing are pursued in the articles
by Julie Stewart and Jamie Cameron. Stewart's article presents an
introduction to mandatory sentencing laws in the United States at the
federal and state level and their arbitrary, yet profound, impact upon
ordinary citizens convicted of drug offences. Her description of the
legislative process that led to the determination of the sentence for various
offences as a bidding war contrasts sharply with her account of the
painstaking and arduous law reform campaigns undertaken to chip away at
mandatory sentences. Stewart echoes Doob and Cesaroni's insight that
politically, mandatory sentences are far easier to enact than to repeal.
In her contribution to this volume, Cameron reviews the U.S.
jurisprudence on the Eighth Amendment's protection against "cruel and
unusual punishment"24 as applied to mandatory sentences of imprisonment.
Given the legal and constitutional differences between the two countries
and the very different forms that mandatory sentencing regimes have taken
in the United States, her article cautions against reliance on U.S. law by
Canadian law- and policy-makers. She suggests that if the death penalty is
not considered unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court, then
it is possible to understand why mandatory, lengthy imprisonment, even for
minor property offences, is seen by this Court as cruel, but not necessarily
unusual. Cameron's conclusion is that the United States has only negative
lessons to offer to Canada, particularly in light of the similar stance of
judicial deference to legislative sentencing policy taken by the highest
courts of each country.
A number of the articles included in this special issue address the
specific impact of mandatory sentences on particular groups. Larry
Chartrand and Ren~e Pelletier both examine the effects for Aboriginal
peoples in Canada, and Faizal Mirza's article examines the distorted impact
2 4 U.S. Const. Amend. VIII.
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of mandatory minimum sentencing on African-Canadians. In his article,
Chartrand uses the data generated by recent Australian sentencing laws in
Western Australia and the Northern Territory to speculate about the
effects of mandatory sentencing practices for Aboriginal people in Canada.
He refers to the over-representation of Aboriginal people in prison, the
nature of offences with which they are charged, and the role of firearms in
Aboriginal hunting as significant factors that will produce a disparate
vulnerability of Aboriginal offenders to mandatory imprisonment for
offences committed with firearms. Chartrand points out that the
ameliorative purpose of section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, which
directs sentencing judges to consider sanctions other than imprisonment for
all offenders, "with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal
offenders," 25 will be obliterated by mandatory minimum sentences of
imprisonment. He thus makes out a case that these laws violate sections 12
and 15 of the Charter.
Pelletier focuses on the further evisceration of section 718.2(e) by
two Supreme Court decisions, R. v. Gladue26 and R. v. Wells.2" While
crediting Gladue's broad statements regarding the significance of section
718.2(e) for Aboriginal peoples as a legislative attempt to reduce their
over-representation in provincial and federal prisons across Canada, she
identifies a number of systemic issues for Aboriginal offenders left
unaddressed by the Court, which blunt the section's potential to change the
Aboriginal incarceration rate. In Wells, the Court set out the legal analysis
to be undertaken when a sentencing judge must consider section 718.2(e)
and section 742.1, which permit a judge to order that a sentence of
imprisonment be served in the community as opposed to in an institution.
Pelletier argues that Wells also contributes to the nullification of the
legislative effort to de-incarcerate Aboriginal people by requiring judicial
consideration of section 718.2(e) only after a judge has decided to impose
a sentence of imprisonment, thereby facilitating net-widening.
The effects of mandatory sentencing laws on racialized Canadians,
particularly African-Canadians, are the subject of Mirza's article. He relies
on statistics from the United States on mandatory sentences for drug
offences and "three strikes" laws to paint a picture of the massive over-
representation of African-Americans among those imprisoned under these
laws. Mirza uses the available data in Canada to argue that since African-
5 Criminal Code, supra note 15, s. 718.2(e).
26 [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 [hereinafter Gladue].
27 [2000] 1 S.C.R. 207 [hereinafter Wells].
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Canadians experience targeted policing, negative exercises ofprosecutorial
discretion in elections about how to proceed with the charges, greater
opposition to bail, fewer opportunities to plea bargain, and sentencing
decisions that are more punitive than those received by similarly situated
white offenders, it is reasonable to expect that African-Canadians will have
an increased chance of being on the receiving end of a mandatory minimum
sentence, especially the new mandatory sentences for offences committed
with firearms. He cautions that the long-term effects of mandatory
sentences will be to legitimize systemic racism and to forestall the
development of an anti-racist legal analysis in the criminal justice system.
Two of the articles in this special issue examine the implications of
mandatory minimum sentences on the integrity of the prosecutorial
process. Using the available knowledge and experience that has diagnosed
how wrongful comictions are systematically produced by the structural and
ideological parameters of criminal investigation and prosecution, Dianne
Martin argues that mandatory sentencing schemes play a significant role in
generating informants and, in particular, jailhouse informants. In turn,
informant evidence is precisely the kind of evidence that was critical in
wrongly convicting Donald Marshall Jr., David Milgaard, and Guy Paul
Morin, as well as the Birmingham Six, the Guildford Four, and the Maguire
Seven in the United Kingdom. Martin uses the U.S. experience, wvhich
shows that many accused vill turn informant and others will confess to
crimes demonstrably not committed to avoid mandatory prison sentences,
to caution against the pursuit of new mandatory minimum sentencing
schemes in Canada.
In my contribution, I argue that mandatory sentences distort
defences to murder, and particularly defences for battered women on trial.
I identify three ways in which self-defence for battered women is distorted
by the mandatory life sentence: women systematically abandon legitimate
self-defence arguments and plead guilty to manslaughter; when they do
proceed to trial for murder, their self-defence claims are frequently framed
in syndrome and stereotype rather than in the brutal realities of their lives;
and their defence may also be re-cast as an effort to defend their children
rather than their own lives. The transcript of a murder prosecution of a
battered woman who faced trial in Manitoba in 1998 is used to make vid
the power of a mandatory life sentence to extract guilty pleas from
vulnerable women and to provide concrete illustrations of the many
distortions of self-defence in the evidence presented at trial. I conclude that
no law reform other than abolition of the mandatory life sentence can shift
the enormous power imbalance between battered w-omen and prosecutors,
and that no other legal strategy can restore a measure of democracy to the
2001]
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murder trial by separating the roles of prosecutors, juries, and judges to
pursue, to judge, and to sentence.
Archie Kaiser and Fiona Sampson are two of the three contributors
to this volume who express reservations about abandoning mandatory
minimum sentences. Both write from a disability rights perspective and give
serious attention to the symbolic meaning of the mandatory sentence for
murder when the victim is a person with disabilities. Kaiser and Sampson
focus on the Latimer case, in which Robert Latimer was on trial for the
murder of his daughter Tracy, who lived with serious disabilities. Poonam
Puri is the third author who makes a case for the retention and expansion
of mandatory sentencing, arguing that for corporate offending, mandatory
fines may be the optimal symbolic and economic sanction.
In his article, Kaiser examines the "insidious images of disability"
used in the Latimer case to describe both the victim and Latimer's
motivation, arguing that these images undermine the equality rights of the
victim, as well as of all Canadians who experience disability. He argues that
if Latimer is to be the crucible within which we evaluate the merit of
mandatory sentencing, then the case against mandatory sentencing cannot
be made out given the violations of the rights of a child with disabilities that
would follow from such a position. Kaiser rejects proposals to extend
clemency to Robert Latimer or to create a new, mitigated offence of
"compassionate homicide." Instead he argues that the risks to the lives of
Canadians with disabilities demand new offences and sentencing structures
that are specifically designed to respect their equality rights and to
condemn parental violence against children with disabilities.
Sampson's article describes the contradictions confronted by the
DisAbled Women's Network (DAWN) Canada in its intervention in the
Latimer litigation and the invitation it received to join a feminist coalition
advocating the abolition of all mandatory minimum sentences, including
life imprisonment for murder. While acknowledging the many equality
rights violations occasioned by mandatory sentencing laws, she notes that
the proposal to abolish the mandatory sentence for murder in order to
allow judges to account for extenuating circumstances raises difficult issues
for women with disabilities, particularly in light of DAWN'S position
supporting the mandatory sentence inLatimer. Sampson reads the decision
of the Supreme Court in Latimer upholding the mandatory life sentence as
a qualified success for women with disabilities. As such, DAWN cannot
support the abolition of the mandatory life sentence for murder until
judicial sentencing powers are effectively constrained by the equality rights
guarantees of section 15 of the Charter.
Puri's discusses another context within which mandatory sentences
may serve a significant function: the legal sanctioning of corporate
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criminality. She argues that public enforcement of criminal law prohibitions
against corporate wrongdoing is desirable, but notes that most corporate
crimes have been effectively de-criminalized such that only quasi-criminal,
regulatory frameworks are available to condemn these activities. Further,
the enormous doctrinal hurdles that must be surmounted to obtain
convictions make effective sentences even more critical for these offenders.
Using an economic analysis, Purl argues that fines must be fixed at a level
that exceeds the expected gain to the offender, but she reports that
corporate offenders almost invariably receive the benefit of a discretionary
sentencing scheme. According to Purl, the category of offences that
currently uses a minimum fine structure-income tax offences-should be
expanded to include other corporate crimes. She also advocates raising the
level of mandatory fines to account for the risk of detection in order to
make corporate criminal activity less profitable.
Finally, in the article that concludes this volume, Isabel Grant
examines alternatives to the use of a mandatory life sentence for murder.
She undertakes a thorough review of Canada's murder laws, noting
unfairness and inconsistencies in the laws that purportedly reserve the
"worst" mandatory sentences for the "worst" offenders and offences. Grant
then picks up the comparative law thread in order to identify the
similarities and points of departure between Canada's sentencing law for
murder and those of the United States, England, and Australia. One
important insight that she culls from this survey is that the discretionary
sentencing regime for murder in New South Wales has introduced some
degree of sentence disparity. Turning to the reform of Canada's murder
law, Grant urges abandonment of the categorization of degrees of murder
and of the lengthy parole ineligibility that is specific to murder. She would,
however, retain a presumptive life sentence for murder that can be avoided
by the trial judge only if this sentence would amount to a miscarriage of
justice.
The articles in this volume represent an effort to respond to the
growing political and legal importance of mandatory minimum sentences
in Canada. While the majority of the contributors counsel against the use
of mandatory minimum sentences, this analysis is enriched by the
significant dissent registered by authors advocating the rights of people vth
disabilities, by the efforts to hold corporations accountable for criminal
wrongdoing, and in light of the patterns of judicial discretion under more
open-ended sentencing regimes.
There is much research and analysis left to be done if Canadian
researchers and policy-makers are to fully understand the effects of
mandatory sentences and to develop sentencing alternatives. Greater focus
on the ordinary mandatory sentences administered daily by the lower
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courts, such as drivers' license revocation for drunk driving and hefty
mandatory fines for driving without insurance, is necessary if we are to
examine mandatory sentences in all of their forms. Empirical research on
mandatory sentences and their role in the incarceration rates of racialized
people in Canada is needed. Investigation of the specific effects of
mandatory sentences for women, including racialized and Aboriginal
women and women prisoners, should also be undertaken. Legal devices,
other than mandatory minimum sentences, to control discriminatory
exercises of prosecutorial and judicial discretion should be considered in
order to protect the interests of people with disabilities, the poor, and
racialized individuals. Creative attention to new legal forms and sentencing
for the criminal conduct of corporations is rare but critical to the
development of sentencing literature. Finally, Grant's proposal to re-
conceptualize the sentencing structure for murder in the absence of a
mandatory life sentence raises a very significant question as to what parole
for murder might look like under such a revised law. These and many other
issues will, hopefully, engage future scholars and contribute to rational
reform of mandatory minimum sentencing laws in Canada.
